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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
STATE V. WAINE: A COURT MAY REOPEN A CLOSED POST
CONVICTION PROCEEDING TO ADDRESS A CHALLENGE
TO AN ADVISORY ONLY JURY INSTRUCTION.
By: Ashley N. Nelson-Raut
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that advisory only jury instructions
are not harmless error and the Unger v. State precedent should be applied
retroactively. State v. Waine, 444 Md. 692, 122 A.3d 294 (2015). In addition,
the court held that a defendant’s motion to reopen his or her post-conviction
case after the Unger decision met the “interests of justice” standard required
for reconsideration of the constitutionality of the defendant’s conviction. Id.
at 695, 122 A.3d at 294.
In 1976, Peter Sutro Waine (“Waine”) was tried before a jury in the Circuit
Court for Harford County for first-degree murder and larceny. The presiding
judge gave jury instructions stating, “you are judges, judges of the facts and
the law,” and instructed that anything he stated regarding the law was advisory
only. Defense counsel did not object to the advisory only jury instructions. The
jury found Waine guilty of first-degree murder and larceny. Subsequently, the
judge sentenced Waine to two consecutive life sentences in prison for firstdegree murder, and an additional fourteen years in prison for larceny. In 1977,
Waine, acting pro se, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
In 1997, Waine sought post-conviction relief based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel and claimed that the presiding judge erred in giving
advisory only jury instructions. Waine, 444 Md. at 698, 122 A.3d at 297. The
post-conviction court denied Waine’s appeal. Id. In 2007, Waine filed a
motion to reopen his petition for post conviction relief. Id. Waine’s claim was
dormant until 2012, when the Circuit Court for Harford County reopened his
motion based on the Unger decision. Id. at 698-99, 122 A.3d at 297-98. After
a hearing, Waine was granted post-conviction relief. Id. The court of special
appeals denied the State’s application for leave to appeal, so the State
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first considered whether the Unger
holding, that advisory only jury instructions are not harmless error, should be
overruled because the holding did not conform to stare decisis. Waine, 444
Md. at 699, 122 A.3d at 298. The court recognized two exceptions for when
a court may depart from stare decisis. Id. at 700, 122 A.3d at 298. First, a
court may depart from stare decisis when an extensive amount of time has
passed, rendering the prior decision archaic and inapplicable. Waine, 444 Md.
at 699, 122 A.3d at 298 (citing Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md.
679, 689, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013)). Second, a court may depart from stare decisis
if the holding is clearly wrong. Waine, 444 Md. at 701, 122 A.3d at 299, (citing
DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 64, 5 A.3d 45 (2010)).
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The court held that the Unger court rightfully deviated from stare decisis
because the precedent was clearly wrong and archaic. Waine, 444 Md. at 70001, 122 A.3d at 299. Thus, the court reasoned that the Unger court was
justified in overruling precedent that stated a defendant’s failure to object to
advisory only jury instructions constituted a waiver of the defendant’s right.
Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the Unger court properly overruled State
v. Adams. Id. Thus, the court held that precedent set forth in Stevenson v. State
and Montgomery v. State established a new constitutional standard in
Maryland for non-advisory jury instructions. This standard cannot be waived
by the defense’s failure to object to advisory only jury instructions during trial.
Id. (citing Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558 (1980), Montgomery
v. State, 292 Md. 84, 437 A.2d 654 (1981), and State v. Adams, 406 Md. 240,
958 A.2d 295 (2008)).
Next, the court addressed whether the circuit court retained discretion to
deny a defendant’s motion to reopen a post conviction proceeding after Unger.
Waine, 444 Md. at 702, 112 A.3d at 299. The court reasoned that a change in
a law that intended to apply retroactively must meet the “interests of justice”
standard in order to justify the court’s decision to reopen a petition for post
conviction relief. Id. at 702-03, 122 A.3d at 300. (citing Gray v. State, 388 Md.
366, 382-83, 879 A.2d 1064, 1073 (2005)). In applying this standard to Waine,
the court held that given the nature and time of Waine’s trial and the
developing case law, the court had reasonable discretion to reopen Waine’s
post-conviction proceeding. Id. In addition, the court noted that failure to
object to advisory only jury instructions would likely be considered a waiver,
thus providing additional reason to reopen a post conviction. Id. The court
further noted that deference must be given to case precedent that ensures the
appropriate fundamental due process protection. Id. at 702, 122 A.3d at 300.
Finally, the court considered what test to apply when considering a
challenge to an advisory only jury instruction. Waine, 444 Md. at 703, 122
A.3d at 300. The court rejected the State’s proposal to apply a reasonable
likelihood test in determining whether jurors understood the jury instruction.
Id. at 703, 122 A.3d at 301. The court articulated that a reasonable likelihood
test is applicable when jury instructions are ambiguous. Id. The court further
reasoned that advisory only jury instructions are not ambiguous, but are
erroneous because they give the jury permission to disregard the judge’s
instructions. Id. Thus, advisory only jury instructions enable the jury to
disregard due process instructions regarding the defendant’s innocence and the
State’s burden of proof. Id. Therefore, the court held that a judge giving
advisory only jury instructions was not an error in which a harmless error
analysis could be applied. Id.
In Waine, the Court of Appeals of Maryland’s decision to uphold Unger
was justified because Unger created new case precedent, that advisory only
jury instructions create a non-harmless error to the defendant. This decision
provides a bright-line rule for judges, creating a ban of advisory only jury
instructions. Thus, it is crucial for judges to make clear to the jury that his or
her instructions are not advisory, and must be followed in order to ensure that
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cases will not be re-tried because of an error, and to ensure a fair trial for the
defendant.
Practitioners must scrutinize jury instructions to ensure that they are
reasonable and that they ensure the defendant’s rights. The court’s decision
to allow defendants to bring forth claims retroactively will further overwhelm
the court systems in Maryland, take additional time to re-try the cases, and will
require additional funding for attorneys’ fees and court costs. Judges and
practitioners are not the only persons affected by this decision. The defendants
that have fallen victim to advisory only jury instructions, whether or not they
had counsel who objected to the instructions, received an unfair trial and
deserve a new trial. All members of the justice system should use the Waine
precedent to strategically fight for these defendants to ensure that they obtain
the justice to which they are entitled.

